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Abstract 
The establishment of Law No. 23/2007 on Railway set to eliminate monopolization by 
incumbent operators and giving opportunity to the private sector and local government to 
join the railway sector. Ironically, the new law is not completely implemented due to 
budget constraints and weak basis of restructuring. Proper preconditions have to be created 
to ensure its success. The paper uses a literature review involving a material harmonization 
study. Based on the research, legal framework amendment, assets re-evaluation, human 
resources assessment and obvious support from the government can be considered as the 
most essential preconditions, together with the existence of good governance. 
 
Keywords: Railway restructuring, Law No. 23/2007 on Railway, Indonesia. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Background  
Indonesian railway began the restructuring 
process on 1998 with huge loan from 
World Bank under the name of the 
Railway Efficiency Project (REP). The 
main obstacle behind the restructuring 
process is the huge cost should be 
burdened by the government of Indonesia. 
That huge spending comes from subsidies 
and maintenance of rolling stock (Nikmah 
and Wijiati, 2008). 
 
Railway restructuring during that period 
was only carried out in the intern structure 
of the company itself. Railway was still 
being monopolized by government. In this 
case, government played as owner, 
regulator and operator. Source of 
budgeting for development was solely 
from Indonesian State Budget, which has 
been set every year. This condition was 
agonized by the low support of the 
government. The government tends to 
develop road transportation rather than 
railway. As the neglected sector, 
Indonesian railway was trying to improve 
its performance by doing some betterment. 
An important reform was initially started 
in 2007 by the establishment of the new 
railway law. 
 
Law No. 23/2007 on Railway is fulfilled 
with the idea of restructuring. The 
monopoly era of PT. Kereta Api Indonesia 
(Indonesian Railways Company) has been 
ended and private sectors and/or local 
governments are allowed to enter the 
railway business not only for the provision 
of train service but also in track 
construction, maintenance and operation. 
During the implementation of this law, it 
has been seen that some approaches were 
not properly implemented. Some concepts 
are needed to be revised in order to be 
more applicable. Preconditions set for the 
Law No. 23/2007 on Railway need to be 
formulated to ensure that the restructuring 
process running in the properly and 
achieving the objectives. 
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Main Objectives  
The objectives of this paper are to:  
1. Investigate the current development of 
railway restructuring in Indonesia;  
2. Investigate whether Law No. 23/2007 
of Indonesian Railway could have any 
significant impact in ensuring the 
success of railway restructuring 
program; 
3. Formulate restructuring option for 
Indonesia  
4. Set the preconditions or requirements as 
a solution during the process of 
restructuring.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Characteristic of State Owned Railway 
In mostly countries, railways are being 
operated under one state owned company 
who are responsible for managing the 
railway infrastructure and providing train 
services (UNESCAP, 2003). Monopoly 
practices are beginning to become very 
popular as a basic system in the railway 
sector and this is generally known as the 
traditional theory of railway. Richard T. 
Ely (1937) firstly mentioned that due to 
operational property, railway and other 
public facilities have natural monopoly 
characteristic which is believed to deliver 
high efficiency and stability. UNESCAP 
(2003) also states that: “State-owned 
railways have therefore often been 
organized as vertically-integrated publicly 
owned monopolies.” 
 
Efficiency and stability delivered by state 
owned railways can be seen from Japan 
National Railway (JNR) operation, which 
dominated the market of freight and 
passenger. It also had important role in 
term of post-war economic recovery until 
the 1950s when it started to loss its 
competitiveness against other transport 
mode. (Aoki, E. et al, 2000). However, the 
circumstances of transport market in recent 
twenty years comes led to the conclusion 
that monopoly systems of state railways 
should be reformed in order to ensure the 
service quality and performance of railway 
operation. It is hugely accepted that state-
owned monopolistic railways were 
generally known to be ‘inefficient and 
unworkable’ (Kopicky and Thompson, 
1995; ECMT, 2004, 2005) and 
restructuring process should be carried out 
in order to reclaim the performance of the 
system. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The primary source of data will be from 
Ministry of Transportation. The main 
sources of information have been derived 
from various books and journals at the 
university and from the internet. The data 
related to railway restructuring in 
Indonesia is being gathered and 
investigated to find the link to the research 
objective. 
 
Secondary data has been used in this 
research to describe the implementation of 
the approach proposed in the Indonesian 
railway network as the case study. Data 
are taken from the Directorate General of 
Railways (DGR) as the regulatory body 
and PT. Kereta Api Indonesia (PT. KAI) 
as the operator of train services. 
Furthermore, this research can be 
classified as descriptive research, since a 
structure is set up to answer who, what, 
where and how type questions. 
Information related to the research will be 
clearly defined. 
 
 
RESTRUCTURING RESULTS 
Ambiguity on the Way of Restructuring 
In present condition, PT. KAI handles the 
infrastructure operations and train services. 
The impact of this is the difficulty in 
entering the railway market sector, as PT. 
KAI are reluctant to release its former role. 
The problem related to competition will be 
elaborated on the next section. Another 
problem is related to the objective of PT. 
KAI, as an incumbent operator, the 
government mandates that PT. KAI 
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provide public service tasks. At the same 
time, PT. KAI also has to gain profit from 
its operation. Law No. 23/2007 on 
Railway clearly states that the government 
cannot directly operate the rail 
infrastructure and train services, unless in 
the absence of private operator. Lubis 
(2007) considers this phrase dilemmatic. 
In present, PT. KAI is being 
acknowledged as the incumbent 
infrastructure operator and service 
provider, but the government can form a 
new special company for restructuring 
within this three years transitional period 
as stated on the law. 
 
As stated in the Article 214 of Law No. 
23/2007, PT. KAI was given three years to 
adapt with the new system. Related with 
that transitional time, the government has 
instructed PT. KAI to do the 
organizational restructuring, which is the 
separation, based on the line of business 
(soft unbundling). With this mechanism, 
PT. KAI has to separate the division on the 
specific duty such as rolling stock, 
ticketing and track maintenance. 
 
There is some ambiguity in way of 
restructuring which directly impact to PT. 
KAI as the incumbent operator. The 
previous organizational reform carried out 
by PT. KAI based the government agenda 
is different from the intention of the law. 
Law No. 23/2007 indicates that the proper 
restructuring way is vertical separation 
which means both infrastructure and 
services are managed by different bodies 
(see Figure 1).  
 
In other words, PT. KAI should be 
prepared to compete with new company in 
railway sector. In the author’s opinion, the 
previous restructuring agenda of PT. KAI 
set by the government was not properly 
matched with the law. This condition may 
lead to a big question related to the 
competitiveness level of PT. KAI toward 
the multi operator regime. 
 
Degree of Competition 
The expected concept of Indonesian 
railway is multi operator railway. DGR 
(2010) describes that in multi operator 
railway; there will be competition between 
the train operator and the infrastructure 
provider. Recently, PT. KAI has a role as 
the train operator, working together with 
other train services operator from private 
company. This option is a modification of 
the previous framework by giving more 
opportunities for the private sector. The 
opportunity for private sector was given 
only in providing train service as operator 
while the infrastructure management and 
operation is still fully managed by PT. 
KAI. In fact, there is only one involved 
company named PT. KAI Commuter 
Jabodetabek, which is responsible for train 
service operating in the Jabodetabek area. 
PT. KAI Commuter Jabodetabek is 
actually the subsidiary of PT. KAI. Pure 
Figure 1 Ambiguity of Restructuring Agenda 
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private company involvement doesn’t 
exist. 
 
The author identifies that the problem may 
come from the duality role of the 
incumbent operator. PT. KAI still 
dominates the operation of infrastructure. 
It owns station, signaling system and other 
facilities. The problem occurs when a new 
train operator company wants to use this 
facility. Permission from PT. KAI, as the 
incumbent infrastructure operator, is 
needed. On the other hand, PT. KAI also 
acts as a train operator company using the 
same facilities as the new candidates of 
operator companies and competes with 
them. With respect to PT. KAI, the 
decision related to infrastructure tends to 
be not fair. It is still arguable, but in the 
author’s opinion, this condition may lead 
into some partially policy which brings 
lucrative situation for only one party, PT. 
KAI itself. 
 
The Government Intervention on the 
Infrastructure Providing   
Intervention of the government of 
Indonesia in the provision of infrastructure 
can be seen from the 2011 Indonesian 
State Budget Draft. It is mentioned in the 
document that the government of 
Indonesia over the budgeting draft for 
infrastructure provision for four trillion 
rupiahs. The Ministry of Transportation, 
particularly Directorate General of 
Railway is appointed to carry out the 
provision program. 
 
This intervention is clearly contradictory 
with the railway law. The position of the 
government based on the law is limited as 
a regulator. Joining the infrastructure 
provision is definitely out of their 
authority. It will be wiser if the 
government appoints PT. KAI than being 
directly involved in the infrastructure 
provision. For the future, as expected by 
the railway law, infrastructure has to be 
provided and managed by independent 
company, out of government intervention. 
Private companies are permitted to built 
the track and earn money from their track 
operation for some years. After the end of 
the permitted operation year, the track will 
be back and owned by the government. 
 
Public Charging and Financial Support 
Mechanism  
Muthohar (2010) explains that the 
actualization of Public Service Obligation 
(PSO), Infrastructure Maintenance 
Operation (IMO) and Track Access 
Charge (TAC) scheme within five years 
after the REP was not yet completed. 
Differences always occurred between the 
demand requested by PT. KAI and the 
realization from the government.  
 
Recently, the actualization of the scheme 
is on the similar trend with the previous 
years. Budget constraint is believed to be 
the main reason between the lack of PSO 
and IMO payment by the government. 
Lubis (2007) records that during the period 
of 2007; the TAC offsets the IMO on the 
amount of around Rp700 billion or 
equivalent to £50 millions. This condition 
directly affects PT. KAI as the sole 
operator in Indonesia since the budget for 
maintenance was always under the actual 
need. Then, Lubis (2007) also adds that 
there is an accumulated backlog in the 
amount of Rp6.5 billion or the equivalent 
of £465k plus another £300k for the rolling 
stock backlog.  
 
The impact of this accumulated backlog as 
mentioned in Muthohar (2010) and is the 
decrease of track in year after year. In 
present, 59 per cent (2.716 km) of the total 
length track is qualified as good condition. 
The rest can be qualified as fair condition 
(494 km or 11 per cent) and bad condition 
(1.391 km or 30 per cent). This condition 
is indicated to be the reason behind the 6 
high number of derailment cases. 
Restructuring of maintenance funding 
should be carried out for the betterment of 
both infrastructure and rolling stock, and 
improvement of safety level. 
 Rekayasa Teknik Sipil Vol 3 Nomer 3/rekat/15 (2015), 20 - 28 
 
24 
 
 
As stated in Muthohar (2010), another 
problem is the implementation of IMO and 
TAC. In practice, the scheme of IMO and 
TAC was not applied properly. Now, the 
maintenance of infrastructure is carried out 
by PT. KAI by using its own money. As a 
response, the government does not collect 
the TAC from PT. KAI. In other words, 
the government presumes that the value of 
TAC is equal to IMO. There is no real 
transfer from the government to PT. KAI 
which has substituted the duty of 
infrastructure maintenance . 
 
During the three years of transition period, 
it can be seen that PT. KAI is the sole PSO 
and IMO receiver and TAC payer. There is 
a risk with the fund flow under one 
organisation related to its initial objectives 
and its implementation, which may lead 
into ineffectiveness. Therefore, Nash et al 
(2002) explains  that subsidy of the train 
operation which is appropriate on social 
considerations will be more effective if it 
is directed at particular services and paid 
to the train operator rather than the 
infrastructure provider. In fact, the train 
operator and infrastructure provider is the 
same company.  
 
Lubis (2007) points out that although the 
contracts were separated, funds that are 
supposed to be utilised for infrastructure 
maintenance (IMO) or as subsidises for the 
economy class train (PSO) were actually 
used by PT. KAI to pay wages or for 
locomotive and other rolling stock 
procurement. This is because the funds 
needed to maintain the track is used for 
other purposes, the track have not been 
fully maintained. Therefore, a clear 
separation of infrastructure provider and 
operator and train service provider should 
be established so that the amount of the 
PSO grant by the government to the train 
operator is fully used to operate and 
manage non-commercial trains. Law No. 
23/2007 implicitly instruct to reform the 
railway in this way. 
 
Another problem arises from the 
calculation of TAC. Santoso (2010) 
mentions that the basic calculations used 
in the TAC contract are still questionable 
since it does not reflect a fair and 
transparent system in the implementation 
of railway reform. Muthohar (2010) adds 
that TAC is calculated based on the 
infrastructure maintenance and operation 
(IMO) paid by the government added with 
the infrastructure depreciation (d) 
multiplied it with an intermodal or inter-
services balancing policy factors (f). The 
intermodal balancing policy factor (f) has 
not attributed with a standard formulation; 
it is only used as a liability factor that 
balances the net of PSO, IMO and TAC. 
 
Since the new law has set that in the future 
of Indonesian railway is multi operational, 
the TAC calculation must be revised. Fair 
TAC can be beneficial in encouraging the 
new company to enter the railway market 
sector. Private sectors absolutely need 
clear, transparent and rationale fare as their 
financial expectation before entering the 
market. 
 
Private Sector Participation  
Another new reform stated on the Law No. 
23/2007 is the chance for open access in 
the railway sector. In the future, it will be 
possible to undertake railway investment 
and funding using Public Private 
Partnership (PPP), private financing or 
local public funding. The amended law 
also addresses authority, service 
standardization, certification, licensing and 
protection of customer’s rights. The law 
recognizes that the railway is an economic 
sector to be organized by sector 
participants in manners that are efficient, 
professional and supportive to national 
economy. Railway infrastructures and 
service businesses, which were previously 
bureaucratic in nature, are to be changed to 
a corporate focus that emphasizes service 
reliability, efficiency and direct interaction 
with economy and industry. 
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Private sector participation can be 
arranged in a form of partnership with the 
related government body. Various 
potential types of private sector 
participation can be shown on the table 5 
on Appendix. According to DGR (2010), 
the interest of private sector to join the 
railways business is mostly focused in coal 
mining. DGR (2010) records that in the 
period of 2010 until 2014; there are several 
projects of track construction for coal 
mining. The projects will be carried out 
under the scheme of Public Private 
Partnership (PPP). 
 
In South Sumatera project, PT. KAI 
arranges Joint Venture Corporation 
(JVCo) with PT. Bukit Asam (coal mining 
company). The total capital of JVCo is 
1.55 billion rupiah, 30 per cent supported 
by PT. Bukit Asam and 70 per cent by PT. 
KAI. Another potential project which 
attract private sector is rail link in 
Soekarno Hatta international airport. DGR 
(2010) mentions that at least there are 
seven private companies which are 
interested to join this project. 
 
 
COMPARATIVE STUDIES WITH 
OTHER COUNTRIES 
1. Britain Railways case study  
In Britain, train operation was under the 
responsibility of Train Operating 
Companies (TOCs) while the management 
of infrastructure was held by Rail track 
namely Network Rail. This term existed 
after the establishment of Railway Act 
1993 (Kopicki and Thompson, 1995). 
Basically, the structure of privatized 
railway in Britain can be described as 
follows: 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Structure of Britain Railway  
Source: Kopicki and Thompson, 1995 
 
2. Swedish Railways case study  
The Swedish 1988 reform pioneered 
railway restructuring for all of Europe 
(Kopicki and Thompson, 1995). The 
process was initially started in 1988 when 
the Swedish state railway, Statens 
Järnvägar was split into two companies, 
Statens Järnvägar (SJ) and Banverket 
(BV). Banverket (BV) is responsible to 
control the track network. The second one, 
Statens Järnvägar (SJ), is responsible to 
operate the train. So, it is basically a 
vertical restructuring or hard unbundling 
by the separation of infrastructure and 
train operation management. The 
interesting approach learned from Swedish 
restructuring program is the involvement 
of Local County to fulfill their local 
passenger services. 
 
RESTRUCTURING OPTION FOR 
INDONESIAN RAILWAYS  
The restructuring option for Indonesian 
Railways basically can be divided into 
three main proposals. The basic concept of 
restructuring is vertical restructuring or 
hard unbundling. Within this option, the 
separation between infrastructure and train 
operation must be carried out. Actually, 
the Law No. 23/2007 has set that 
Indonesian railway should be restructured 
with this option but unfortunately the 
implementation was still far from its initial 
pattern. 
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Privatization of British Railways can be 
considered as a failure (Joy, 1997; 
Thompson, 2004), therefore this system 
will not be chosen. The Swedish system 
gives more beneficial impact than the 
British one. Separation between 
infrastructure and train operation is still 
being regarded as the first option.  
 
The restructuring option for Indonesian 
Railways basically can be divided into 
three main proposals. The basic concept of 
restructuring is vertical restructuring or 
hard unbundling. Within this option, the 
separation between infrastructure and train 
operation must be carried out. Actually, 
the Law No. 23/2007 has set that 
Indonesian railway should be restructured 
with this option but unfortunately the 
implementation was still far from its initial 
pattern. Since the privatization on British 
Railway was acknowledge as a failure, it 
will be better if Indonesia adopt the way 
from Sweden. In this case PT. KAI as state 
owned railway should be split into two 
companies with different responsibility, 
one for infrastructure, other for train 
operation. 
 
Another consideration is the geographical 
condition of Indonesia. Coordination can 
be a obvious problem in archipelagic 
country. In order to minimize the impact 
of geographical constraint, the horizontal 
separation can be a good solution. This 
approach has been implemented in Japan 
since Japan is archipelagic country as well. 
The question will arise related to the 
restructuring program which has been 
carried out by PT. KAI, soft unbundling. 
In the author opinion, this option is an 
initially good for further process, hard 
unbundling. Development of soft 
unbundling is a subsidiary which latterly 
can stand itself, separated from PT. KAI. 
The existence of some companies with 
different business can be a good 
foundation for the process of vertical 
separation. 
 
SETTING THE PRECONDITION  
 
Figure 3 Staggered Precondition Process 
 
From the figure above, the role of 
government become very essential since 
the restructuring process can be considered 
as its initiative. A special body should be 
created to formulate the scenario of 
restructuring. This body can be consisted 
of Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of 
State Enterprises, and Ministry of Finance. 
But, before that process is being carried 
out, an assessment of asset, market, and 
human resources is absolutely needed to 
measure the potential and readiness of 
railway to be restructured. 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
1. The establishment of Law No.23/2007 
on Railway is a part of the 
government’s railway reform agenda. 
Despite the new railway law delivering 
some new visions relating to the 
restructuring program, several 
preconditions need to be envisaged 
carefully.  
2. Railway reform in Indonesia was driven 
by coercive process by the involvement 
of World Bank through Railway 
Efficiency Project (REP). Since the 
stagnant railway performance after the 
government initiative
- asset evaluation
- market evaluation
- human resources management
establish Restructuring Planner 
set the legal framework contains 
detail "rule of game"
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project, the idea of restructuring was 
repeatedly raised. The result was the 
establishment of Law No. 23/2007 on 
Railway.  
3. Law No. 23/2007 on Railway brings 
two important changes by ending the 
monopolistic right of PT. KAI as the 
sole and incumbent operator and 
permitting open access to private sector 
and local government to enter the 
railway sector. Now, the years after the 
establishment of the new railway law, 
there is no significant change on the 
Indonesian railway. The government 
budget constraints can be regarded as 
the main barrier, as well as the weak 
basis of restructuring program. The 
reluctance of the incumbent operator to 
enforce the law, inefficient funding 
scheme through PSO, IMO and TAC, 
absence of private sector participation 
are the impact of this weak foundation.  
4. The restructuring option for Indonesia 
can be a combination between three 
approaches, horizontal separation, 
functional separation, and vertical 
separation. At least there are four things 
can be regarded as the most important 
precondition, namely legal framework, 
asset assessment, human resources 
evaluation, and good governance and its 
support. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
For further improvements of railway 
restructuring process in Indonesia, the 
following recommendations are suggested 
by the author based on the results of the 
study.  
1. The bundling mechanism in the funding 
of PSO, IMO and TAC in Indonesia 
indicates an inefficient implementation 
in railway development.  
2. Ministry of Transportation, particularly 
Directorate General of Railway should 
create a special agency which only 
concerning with in assessing the 
bankable railway projects and 
promoting them to private sector.  
3. Further studies related the most suitable 
option of railway restructuring by 
investigating the methods from other 
country and doing some modification 
based on actual condition in Indonesia;  
4. The law needs working detail in the 
definition of and boundaries between  
5. PT. KAI is expected to remain broadly 
involved in all railway businesses due 
to its extensive managerial and 
technical experiences that have been 
developed over many years.  
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